Continued from Part 1:

What follows in are my notes, capturing some of each panelist’s remarks.

Humberto de la Calle, Colombia. He thanked Sergio Jaramillo for his work in designing the approach (modelo) used in these negotiations. He then listed four key moments and topics. First, the initial unilateral cease-fire implemented by the FARC was an important gesture of good faith. Second, the priority given rural reform, noting that the first agreement in the peace accord deals with this topic. This conflict began in the countryside (el campo), so the negotiations had to begin there, too. Third, regional conversations held in almost every part of Colombia concurrently with the negotiations in Havana. Fourth, an innovative system of transitional justice, not just for the FARC, but for all involved and implicated in this conflict; and the central role of victims in the negotiations of this topic. Indeed, the accord’s fifth agreement is simply called “Victimas”. The agreement included a special focus on gender and women’s human rights, as the majority (@70%) of the estimated 8.5 million victims of this war were women.

The country has to learn that there is not just one truth about this conflict; there are many. And learning these truths is not just about knowing the history of the conflict, but about taking responsibility for our roles in it. Finally, this peace agreement is not simply a “small peace” ending a conflict, but a “large peace” opening new paths for Colombia and new opportunities for all Colombians. Implementing this accord will present the Government with significant challenges, not only bureaucratic and financial, but also moral (un desafio moral).

Sergio Jaramillo Caro, Colombia. These negotiations involved the two sides cooperating with each other without ever abandoning their ideas or their politics. The six months of secret negotiations behind closed doors and shuttered windows in a small room in Havana built trust between the parties and created the agenda for the negotiations. In addition to building trust, the secret negotiations strengthened each side’s commitment to the peace process.

Important to the success of these negotiations was the full participation of Colombia’s Armed Forces, including a number of generals. Also important was the involvement of the international community. The negotiations were formally guaranteed by Norway and Cuba and additionally sponsored by Chile and Venezuela.

Continued in Part 3 forthcoming next week...

Andrea Schneider is a professor at Marquette Law School teaching ADR, Negotiation, Ethics, International Law, International Conflict Resolution and Art Law. She is the author or co-author of numerous books and book chapters in the field of dispute resolution. She serves as the editor of ADR Prof Blog.